Russia has been the largest backer of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ensuring his physical safety after fleeing Syria. However, China’s previous role in blocking international efforts to refer Assad to the International Criminal Court (ICC) played an equally significant role in shielding him from justice mechanisms through the Syrian war. Now, as Syrians call for accountability and demand that Assad be brought to justice for his alleged crimes, the question arises: will China’s stance shift?
In May 2014, China voted alongside Russia to veto a UNSC draft resolution co-sponsored by at least 58 countries referring the Syrian Arab Republic for investigation by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity. The resolution drew its evidence upon various reports from the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, whose findings implicated the Assad government in gross violations of international human rights law and crimes against humanity. In its address to the UNSC concerning its position, China, who is not a signatory of the Rome Statute, offered three justifications for blocking the resolution. First, China argued that any prosecutions should be conducted with respect for state judicial sovereignty and principle of complementarity, noting their reservations over any UNSC referrals for any particular country to the ICC. Second, an ICC referral would derail the peace process and undermine political negotiations. Third, the manner in which the resolution calling for an ICC referral was submitted undermined UNSC consensus.
While these three justifications offer a more pragmatic understanding for China’s negative vote, China’s actions are better framed within its concerns over engaging in global human rights institutions or normalizing their function within global governance. One Chinese scholar, Dan Zhu noted that these concerns are broadly twofold: the ICC poses a threat to Beijing’s authority over domestic affairs as well as the attenuation of China’s influence on international peace and security within the UNSC. The former highlights a long-standing characteristic of China’s foreign policy in regards to the pursuit of mutual respect for non-interference and state-sovereignty. China’s view of sovereignty, in effect, enables it to exercise its own internal authority over its domestic affairs, even when its authority is exercised in manners which are condemned in the broader international community. Here, I am speaking of its policies toward Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. An independent criminal court with authority to pursue human rights investigations into state violations of IHL could create a normative bend toward the weakening of state sovereignty. Framed in this context, China’s objection to referring the Syrian case to the ICC is about the condition of sovereignty in the pursuit of human rights protection. Beijing’s concerns of western intent on coercive intervention (and early concerns of regime change), which it previously raised within UNSC debate over successive Syria resolutions, produced an apprehension of the intent of the proposed referral.
If the international community agreed to hand over the case to the ICC, it would, in China’s view, represent a failure of the UNSC to maintain its job. This introduces the latter of Beijing’s concerns noted by Zhu, namely Beijing’s concern over positionality within the UN Security Council. The ICC, in function, represents a last resort for addressing egregious human rights violations for China because it reflects a failure of the UNSC in its duty to safeguard international peace and security. Syria, in this view, had not reached that point of severity nor had Assad’s atrocities. However, Beijing’s calculation may indeed have been incorrect given the scale of Assad’s atrocities which are daily uncovered since his fall–mass detentions, mass graves, forced disappearance, deliberate starvation by siege, to name a few. Instead, Beijing’s refusal to ascent to an ICC referral was an affirmation that Syria was the domain of the UNSC, where it could exercise its authority to pursue the Syrian peace process while deterring the risk of external intervention into Syria.
China’s cautious approach to international legal accountability, seen in its approach to the ICTY and its resistance to ICC referrals, is rooted in this same belief. During the establishment of the ICTY in 1993, China abstained from the UN Security Council resolution rather than vetoing it outright, reflecting a delicate balance between upholding international norms and protecting state sovereignty. However, Beijing expressed reservations about the ICTY’s jurisdiction and underscored concerns about its potential to set precedents for international judicial mechanisms overriding state authority. These reservations parallel its position on Syria. China’s opposition to ICC referrals for Assad reflects an enduring skepticism toward mechanisms that it perceives as instruments of Western intervention, undermining sovereignty and prioritizing justice over stability.
China’s decision to object to the ICC referral is, thus, driven by both a degree of pragmatism and self-interest. These are not mutually exclusive. For Beijing, the pursuit of peace in Syria outweighed the pursuit of justice. The crux of China’s position is predicated on a belief that stability should be prioritized over justice, as noted in its UNSC address concerning the ICC referral of Kenya. Beijing saw the peace process as the penultimate UNSC priority for Syria to end the war on a negotiated political solution, not external forms of intervention or action targeting Assad for human rights abuses. This view, however, failed to recognize the baseline view of many in the Syrian opposition who experienced state-led violence, bombing campaigns, chemical attacks, and more first-hand. Thus, it might have produced the opposite effect. Why should the Syrian opposition negotiate with an aggressor – Assad – who attacked peaceful protests, arrested and murdered innocent civilians and political dissidents, and escalated the violence into a full civil war? By vetoing the ICC referral, China’s positioning in the Syrian conflict was increasingly viewed by many in the international community as protectionist, self-interested, and pro-government.
China’s opposition to ICC mechanisms also impacts its global image, particularly in the global south. While Beijing frames itself as a defender of sovereignty and a counterbalance to Western interventionism, its stance on Syria risks alienating nations and groups that prioritize humanitarian accountability, especially in post-conflict societies. Countries and civil society actors advocating for stronger international human rights protections often view China’s vetoes as favoring state power over civilian protection. This perception complicates Beijing’s efforts to position itself as a champion of developing nations, especially if its actions are seen as obstructing justice for communities affected by atrocities.
Although this dynamic is not unique to China—for example, the U.S. has shielded Israeli leadership from international accountability mechanisms for its IHL violations in Gaza—the eventual collapse of the Assad regime, driven by the Syrian people, presents Beijing with a distinct challenge. Moving forward, China may find itself in a position to leverage its protection of Assad from the ICC or other accountability mechanisms to secure a role in Syrian reconstruction under a new government. Its stance on Gaza, including criticism of Israeli actions, could also help mitigate the perception of China as merely Assad’s backer, offering a potential counterbalance to its controversial actions in Syria.
Looking ahead, China’s position on holding Assad accountable could evolve depending on shifts in Syria’s political landscape. In a post-Assad scenario, Beijing might recalibrate its approach if doing so serves its broader strategic goals, building its image, preserving influence in the region or protecting its investments in post-conflict reconstruction under the Belt and Road Initiative. Should global norms move toward accountability mechanisms that balance sovereignty with justice, China might engage with frameworks that allow it to uphold its non-interference principle while navigating these demands. However, such a shift would require Beijing to carefully manage the narrative, ensuring any involvement does not establish precedents that could undermine its own sovereignty or domestic stability.
That said, any move by Beijing to engage with justice mechanisms could strain its alignment with Russia, which is likely to remain committed to shielding Assad both politically and legally. Additionally, China may perceive Western efforts, such as attempts to bring Assad to the ICC, as part of broader strategic competition and resist such initiatives on principle. Ultimately, the decisive factor will be the stance of Syrians themselves and the priorities of a new Syrian government. If they advocate for a national justice mechanism to address Assad’s war crimes and atrocities, China’s response will likely depend on its ability to align with these efforts while safeguarding its regional interests. If Beijing resists a push by Syrians to bring Assad to justice, this will complicate China’s ability to pursue other interests in Syria.
Additional reading:
Dan Zhu, “China, the International Criminal Court, and Global Governance,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 74, no. 6 (Aug 2019): 585-608. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1651821.
Kerr, Rosemary Foot. China, the UN, and Human Protection: Beliefs, Power, Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/china-the-un-and-human-protection-9780198843740.
Xue Ru, “China’s Policy Towards the ICC Seen Through the Lens of the UN Security Council,” FICHL Policy Brief Series No. 27. https://www.toaep.org/pbs-pdf/27-xue.
