U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is set to visit the Middle East from February 13 to 18, 2025, with stops in Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. While his visit is officially framed around discussions on the Gaza crisis, Rubio may also use this opportunity to push for broader U.S. regional objectives, including Saudi-Israel normalization, deeper U.S.-GCC security cooperation, curbing Chinese influence, and securing Gulf funding for Gaza reconstruction.
Saudi-Israel Normalization: A Renewed Push?
Rubio may attempt to revive discussions on Saudi-Israel normalization, a topic that gained momentum under the Abraham Accords but stalled amid recent conflicts, particularly the October 2023 Gaza war. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that formal recognition of Israel must be linked to an independent Palestinian state, making it politically difficult for Riyadh to move forward without significant concessions. The conflict in Gaza, along with Israel’s continued expansion of West Bank settlements and the rise of hardline factions within Netanyahu’s government, has further hardened Saudi Arabia’s position. While Saudi officials had previously engaged in quiet security and economic discussions with Israel, the war reinforced their stance that Palestinian self-determination is a prerequisite for normalization. Rubio may explore alternative pathways to encourage Riyadh to gradually open diplomatic channels, potentially through security assurances, economic incentives, or phased normalization tied to tangible steps toward Palestinian sovereignty.
One key factor shaping Saudi calculations is its desire to develop a civilian nuclear program, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman openly stating that Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear capabilities if Iran does. Riyadh has pushed for U.S. assistance in developing nuclear infrastructure, including domestic uranium enrichment, as part of broader normalization talks with Israel. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has sought a formal U.S. defense agreement, akin to NATO-style security guarantees, to bolster its deterrence against Iran. Rubio may attempt to leverage these demands to incentivize Saudi-Israel normalization, but with Saudi leaders publicly reiterating their conditions, any breakthrough will likely depend on Israel’s willingness to engage in meaningful diplomatic gestures toward the Palestinians.
A U.S. Red Line on China-GCC Cooperation?
As part of the Biden and Trump administrations’ broader efforts to counter Chinese influence in the Middle East, Rubio is likely to reiterate U.S. concerns over GCC countries deepening their economic and security ties with Beijing. We could see him issue quietly a warning similar to the one he made in Panama, that the US “cannot, and will not, allow the Chinese Communist Party to continue with its effective and growing control” over critical infrastructure.
More likely, Rubio will caution Gulf states about the risks of expanding cooperation with China, particularly in sensitive sectors like telecommunications, military technology, and port management. The U.S. has already pressured GCC states to reduce reliance on Huawei and limit Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure. If he takes a hard line, Rubio could suggest that unchecked Chinese influence in the Gulf might impact future U.S. security and economic partnerships in the region.
Calling for Maximum Pressure 2.0?
Rubio may also use his visit to push for a revamped version of Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions strategy, targeting Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. If he aligns with President Trump’s foreign policy vision, Rubio could seek GCC backing for tougher economic measures against Iran and its proxies, including stronger enforcement of existing sanctions. However, this could be a challenging sell. Some GCC states, particularly the UAE, have maintained pragmatic economic ties with Iran since the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement and may be reluctant to fully comply with renewed U.S. pressure. The Saudi Arabia-Iran détente has shifted regional dynamics, and Gulf states may not want to risk escalating tensions with Tehran.
At the same time, Rubio may use the visit to gauge GCC reactions to Trump’s interest in renegotiating a new nuclear deal with Iran. While the former president abandoned the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in favor of sanctions, recent reports indicate his administration may be open to a new agreement—though one with far stricter terms than the Obama-era deal. Some Gulf leaders, particularly in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, have long supported a tougher U.S. approach to Iran’s nuclear ambitions but remain wary of any deal that might grant Tehran economic relief without clear security guarantees. Rubio may seek to reassure allies that a future Trump-led negotiation would not come at their expense, while also pressing them to align with Washington’s containment strategy.
Gulf Funding for Gaza Reconstruction?
With senior Trump officials seeking to walk back President Trump’s earlier comments about a U.S. “takeover” of Gaza, Rubio will likely try securing financial commitments from the Gulf for post-war reconstruction of Gaza. While the U.S. wants Gulf states to take the lead in rebuilding efforts, given their economic capacity and regional ties, this will be a tough sell. The U.S. may also frame this as a way for GCC countries to assert their influence in Gaza, potentially counterbalancing Iranian-backed groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.
Gulf states have historically been cautious about committing large sums to Gaza without assurances that funds will be used for infrastructure rather than funneled to militant groups. Or, that any investment could be leveled in a future conflict just a few years down the road. Past reconstruction efforts, including Qatari and UAE aid programs, have faced scrutiny over financial oversight and concerns about funds reaching Hamas. Rubio may need to navigate these concerns and propose mechanisms to ensure transparency in aid distribution, potentially through third-party monitoring or direct oversight by U.S.-aligned institutions. It is not yet clear how they would approach this. The U.S. could approach a model in which Gulf funding is tied to specific development projects rather than broad cash disbursements, ensuring that reconstruction efforts align with U.S. and GCC strategic interests.
There remains one glaring concern over all of this:
Rubio is repeating Trump’s insistence on removing Gaza’s population—a red line for Arab partners: “I think that’s just a realistic reality, that in order to fix a place like that, people are going to have to live somewhere else in the interim.” His remarks suggest that discussions around Gulf funding could include plans for temporary relocation of Palestinians during rebuilding efforts, an idea which will be met with significant regional and international resistance. GCC leaders, particularly in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, may be wary of supporting a plan that could be perceived as legitimizing mass displacement—an international crime—rather than addressing Gaza’s humanitarian crisis.
