By Jesse Marks, August 10, 2025.
Mediation has become an increasingly prominent feature of the foreign policies of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states over the past fifteen years. For GCC countries, mediation has emerged as a flexible tool to manage crises, project diplomatic influence, and reinforce their international profiles as neutral, non-aligned actors. This commentary draws on a dataset of around 30 documented GCC mediation cases from 2007 to 2025 to examine how mediation fits into Gulf foreign policy, the variation in how different Gulf states employ it, and what these patterns reveal about the evolving strategic orientation of the GCC.
Methodology
This analysis draws on Rihla Advisory’s original The Arab Gulf States Mediation Tracker compiled through open-source research documenting mediation initiatives by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman. The dataset captures a broad spectrum of cases, from formal conflict mediation to humanitarian diplomacy—such as prisoner exchanges, hostage negotiations, and quiet facilitation efforts. Mediation is defined expansively to include both structured negotiations and humanitarian interventions, reflecting the adaptive nature of Gulf diplomacy. Qatar appears more frequently in the dataset due to Doha’s consistent public reporting of its mediation activities over recent decades. By contrast, other GCC states publish little or no data on such efforts, necessitating more intensive sourcing to identify their initiatives. While extensive, the dataset is not exhaustive and should be read as a representative record of Gulf mediation. The database will continue to be updated as new initiatives emerge.
Defining Mediation in the GCC Context
Mediation is a new and evolving concept that is deliberately broad and a situational tool which can be adapted to specific contexts. We can observe this in the diversity of ways mediation can occur. It can take the form of formal negotiations between warring states, backchannel diplomacy with non-state actors, or humanitarian interventions such as prisoner exchanges. Each state has its own distinct understanding and practice of mediation that also evolves and matures the more it is applied and practiced. One shared commonality is that mediation is a foreign policy instrument which aims to manage crises, expand influence, and project neutrality in international affairs. This instrument though is largely wielded in pursuit of advancing national interests (broadly defined), but often is reflective of efforts to improve the posture, positioning, and image of an individual mediating actor.
Distinct Mediation Profiles
Although Gulf states share a growing commitment to mediation, each has developed a distinct diplomatic identity and niche within this space.
Qatar
Qatar’s approach leans heavily on humanitarian diplomacy, built on longstanding ties to non-state actors such as Hamas, the Taliban, and Syrian opposition factions. These relationships—while politically contentious—have enabled Doha to mediate where formal state actors cannot, brokering hostage releases, humanitarian pauses, and quiet ceasefires. This has shaped Qatar’s reputation as a pragmatic bridge between adversaries, unconstrained by ideology.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s mediation is anchored in status-driven ambitions and a preference for state-to-state diplomacy. Riyadh prefers to project its image as both a regional anchor of stability and an emerging global power. And, it uses formal convening state-level platforms to reinforce that image. Riyadh hosted the Jeddah talks on Sudan and Arab-Islamic summits on Gaza and the future of a Palestinian state, as well as mediating between India and Pakistan in 2025. In each case, the Kingdom’s leadership directly engaged through official channels with national leadership rather than engaging with insurgent or non-state interlocutors. Its facilitation of a U.S.–Russia summit in 2025 marked perhaps its most visible demonstration of convening power, showcasing Saudi Arabia’s capacity to bring together competing great powers. It is also important to highlight that KSA also uses third party mediation to solve its own tensions with Iran and the Houthis in Yemen.
United Arab Emirates
The UAE treats mediation as a discreet, results-oriented tool to advance national interests. Most of its initiatives are private, but visible successes—most notably in the Russia–Ukraine war and Ethiopia–Eritrea peace deal—have built its credibility as a neutral, efficient broker willing to work behind the scenes. This quiet diplomacy enables Abu Dhabi to operate in sensitive geopolitical arenas where public mediation would likely fail, with successful outcomes often opening pathways for deeper commercial, political, and security ties. For example, the UAE’s initial hesitancy to recognize the new Syrian transitional authorities did eventually shift, and it was accompanied by the announcement of a large investment deal by the UAE’s DP World to develop Syria’s largest port. Additionally, from cases observed, the UAE was more likely to support or engage with another mediator to help facilitate a negotiated outcome.
Kuwait & Oman
Kuwait and Oman play smaller but still important stabilizing roles. Kuwait’s reputation for neutrality, cemented during the Gulf crisis, has enabled it to support UN efforts in Yemen and maintain open channels during moments of regional tension. Oman’s tradition of quiet diplomacy has been equally vital, particularly in sustaining Gulf–Iran dialogue and keeping Saudi and Iranian delegations at the table in the nearly two years leading up to the 2023 Iran–Saudi normalization agreement. While China received most of the public credit, Oman—alongside Iraq—was instrumental in keeping the process alive. Smaller Gulf states can often succeed where larger powers cannot, as they carry fewer political costs for engagement and are seen as potentially less risky interlocutors. Together, they provide discreet, credible backchannels for de-escalation that complement the more visible, high-profile initiatives of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
A Review of the Data
Between 2007 and 2025, GGC mediation has grown both more frequent and more varied in type. As of August 2025, the GCC mediation dataset includes nearly 30 cases across 18 years (though the earliest actually goes as far back as 1989 with the Taif Accords, which ended the Lebanese Civil War), with a number of examples of formal conflict mediation and humanitarian-oriented diplomacy, such as prisoner-of-war exchanges, hostage negotiations, and ceasefire facilitation. While conflict mediation dominated the earlier phase of Gulf mediation, humanitarian mediation has increasingly become a central feature of GCC diplomatic engagement, especially in conflict zones where formal settlement is unlikely or politically risky.
Geographic reach has also expanded. While most early mediation efforts were concentrated in the Arab world—particularly in Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, and Syria—the post-2018 period saw a clear shift toward international arenas. Qatar’s mediation in Afghanistan, the UAE’s facilitation of prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic outreach to India and Pakistan all demonstrate how Gulf states have moved beyond their traditional neighborhood to project influence on a global scale. This marks a curious evolution from mediation as a form of reactive crisis management to proactive foreign policy strategy.
The record of outcomes is mixed. Several efforts—such as Qatar’s negotiations with the Taliban, UAE’s repeated humanitarian exchanges in Ukraine, or the Ethiopia–Eritrea peace agreement facilitated by Abu Dhabi—yielded tangible results. Others, like Saudi Arabia’s Jeddah talks on Sudan, delivered only temporary ceasefires. Still others, including mediation offers without follow-up or stalled dialogues, illustrate the symbolic value of mediation even when talks fail to materialize. This variability suggests that for Gulf states, the act of mediating itself often holds as much diplomatic utility as the outcome.
The evolution of GCC mediation can be broadly divided into three phases. From 2007 to 2013, most mediation efforts remained regional and centered on Arab civil conflicts, such as those in Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen. Qatar was particularly active in this period, leveraging its diplomatic agility and unconventional ties to play a prominent role.
Between 2014 and 2019, humanitarian diplomacy began to take hold as a central feature. Qatar and the UAE increasingly focused on humanitarian corridors, hostage negotiations, and post-conflict recovery. These efforts coincided with intensifying conflicts in Syria, Gaza, and Afghanistan, and were often coordinated with international organizations such as the UN or ICRC. Mediation during this period shifted away from comprehensive political solutions toward limited, discrete, and humanitarian-focused arrangements.
From 2020 onward, the dataset shows a striking expansion in both volume and geographical reach. Saudi Arabia stepped up its mediation footprint with efforts to convene major regional summits and global dialogues. The UAE expanded beyond the Middle East to serve as a mediator in Africa and Ukraine. Qatar, while continuing its humanitarian engagements, has also maintained relevance through sustained involvement in Taliban talks and Gaza humanitarian efforts.
Drivers of the Shift Toward Mediation as Foreign Policy
The first is the pursuit of soft power. In a global order increasingly skeptical of traditional military interventions, Gulf states have found in mediation a way to exert influence without deploying troops or directly competing with regional rivals.
Another driver is the desire for diplomatic branding. Gulf capitals—particularly Doha, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi—have invested heavily in positioning themselves as global dialogue hubs. Hosting peace talks, facilitating backchannels, and sponsoring humanitarian initiatives all contribute to a narrative of principled neutrality and diplomatic seriousness. This is particularly valuable for countries seeking to navigate complex relationships with major powers like the U.S., China, and Russia.
Mediation also aligns with broader efforts at foreign policy diversification. As GCC states reduce their economic reliance on oil and reposition themselves in a shifting global landscape, diplomacy has become a key domain for strategic hedging and diversifying their foreign relations. Mediation as a form of diplomacy enables them to hedge against regional instability by building a diverse range of international ties across ideological divides and secure goodwill from Western and non-Western powers alike.
Humanitarian mediation has also become a cost-effective means for Gulf states to project moral leadership. Securing the release of political prisoners or hostages, or breaking through political gridlock to deliver aid, can bolster a country’s image even when the assistance provided is modest in scale. Gulf states often channel this aid through national Red Crescent organizations, enabling them to operate in contexts where political negotiations are blocked and where UN agencies or INGOs may face restricted access.This enables them to score high-level visibility, low-cost rhetorical wins which can then reinforce a state’s image as a mediator. It is important to note that these mediation cases do not substantively resolve the underlying drives of the conflicts, but are often limited in scope and achievement (e.g. small amounts of aid are not designed to eliminate widespread hunger in Gaza or the release of political prisoners in the Ukraine War without a broader pathway to a ceasefire does not end a conflict).
Managing Mediation Competition
GCC states rarely pursue mediation as a GCC collective and often find themslves competing with each other for differing outcomes in crises. This can undermine the likelihood of a successful and sustainable mediation.
Sudan
In Sudan, Saudi Arabia hosted the Jeddah talks in May 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which produced the “Jeddah Declaration” and a short-lived ceasefire aimed at protecting civilians and enabling humanitarian access. However, the agreement collapsed within a short period of time as fighting resumed, raising questions about the role of the warring parties’ international backers. Reports that some Arab states were providing material or political support to opposing sides—rather than coordinating pressure to sustain negotiations—fueled concerns that Gulf rivalries were undermining the very mediation processes they were seeking to support.
Syria
In 2023, Saudi Arabia and the UAE played instrumental roles in restoring Syria to the Arab League. The UAE, in particular, was eager to position itself as a gateway for Damascus’s reintegration, and leveraged normalization to secure commercial access and a foothold in post-war reconstruction. However, following Assad’s fall in December 2024, Saudi Arabia shifted its alignment to the new Syrian leadership and undercut Emirati influence in the process. The UAE did eventually acquiesce to Syria’s new leadership. Over time, the three Gulf powers—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE—coalesced on a shared vision for Syria, unlocking significant investment commitments to aid its recovery, including billions in Saudi deals and major infrastructure projects with Qatar and the UAE.
These cases underscore how mediation, if not coordinated or managed, can deepen inter-GCC strategic rivalry.
Meanwhile, coordinated GCC mediation could provide a more influential means for solving regional crises, by allowing each country to de-escalate or address different aspects of the same crisis which fall within their respective expertise.
Gaza
In Gaza, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have each pursued distinct mediation tracks. Qatar has taken the lead in brokering a ceasefire, leveraging its direct ties with Hamas to keep negotiations alive. The UAE, maintaining open channels with Israel, has used this access to press quietly for improved humanitarian access and the delivery of aid. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional convener, working to rally international support behind renewed Palestinian statehood negotiations. These tracks do not always align, but their potential overlap creates space for coordinated positions that could accelerate a ceasefire, expand humanitarian access, and advance progress on statehood.
Conclusion
GCC mediation is poised to remain a permanent fixture of Gulf foreign policy. Over the past fifteen years, it has not only grown in scale but also diversified in geography, approach, and specialization across member states. The central challenge now is ensuring that national mediation efforts complement rather than conflict with shared regional priorities. Success will hinge on the Gulf states’ ability to preserve neutrality, balance competing relationships, and deliver durable results. The greatest opportunity lies in developing a collective mediation framework—one that institutionalizes complementarity and strengthens the GCC’s ability to advance common interests, both within the Middle East and in other regions where geopolitical and geoeconomic rivalries risk escalating into violent conflict.
Note: All percentages and shares cited refer specifically to the cases identified in this dataset and do not necessarily reflect an exhaustive record of all Gulf mediation efforts globally. Please see The Arab Gulf Mediation Tracker to access the data.
